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By Ernst Benjamin 
Presentation at the 25th Annual Meeting of the Center for the Study of 
Collective Bargaining in Higher Education and the Profession on April 14, 
1997. 
My discussion of ’faculty and management rights,’ like that of most 
previous Baruch panelists, will explore how collective bargaining affects 
faculty performance of duties ordinarily deemed managerial.1 Chandler and 
Julius, etc. That is, I will not try to delineate specific faculty and 
management rights but rather will consider what rights faculty share with 
administration, why such ’shared governance" is beneficial, and how 
collective bargaining affects the faculty role in academic governance. 
I begin and end with a consideration of Don Wollett’s assertion, at the first 
Baruch Conference, that "faculties cannot expect self-governance through 
academic senates or similar vehicles to survive--at least as institutions of 
significance, if they opt for collective bargaining.’ This assertion contains 
two explicit arguments: first, that faculty engage in self-government and, 
second, that if faculty chose to bargain they will lose self-government. This 
formulation prepares the way for his basic argument: that collective 
bargaining is preferable because it will replace a romantic attachment" to 
"medieval" practices with "20th Century" personnel administration. 
I do not cite this argument simply to disagree with it. I do agree with my 
panel colleague, Caesar Naples, who took the opportunity of the Second 
Conference to rebut Don Wollett’s argument and speak eloquently for the 
merits of continued faculty participation in governance. . And, I have long 
agreed with Caesar’s more recent argument, along with that of Irwin 
Polishook and many others, that collective bargaining and shared-
governance can and often do co-exist successfully.4 Nonetheless, Wollett’s 
arguments bear further consideration. 
Wolletts choice of the term "self-government" rather than shared-
governance is instructive. It enabled him to ask how the faculty can justify a 
system in which they are accountable only to themselves and to ignore the 
actual integration of managerial activities through shared governance.5 By 
exaggerating the extent of faculty managerial authority, and indeed often 
conflating it with supervisory responsibility, Wollett heightened the apparent 
contradiction between shared-governance and collective bargaining. But, if 
his argument does not convince us, it or similar arguments did, as he 
suggested, convince the courts. 
In the independent sector, where Yeshiva prevails, faculty governance and 
collective bargaining do not co-exist. Justice Powell’s finding that faculty are 
managers because "their power in academic matters is absolute" is no less 
unequivocal than Wollett’s attribution of self- governance though it is more 
clearly premised on managerial rather than supervisory authority.6 I do not 
object so much to the exaggeration, as to the fact that the Court’s failure to 
explore the nature of "shared governance" led to the finding that "the 
faculty’s professional interests . . . can not be separated from those of the 
institution." 
The consequent required "alignment of interest" between the faculty and 
administration not only provides the foundation of the finding that faculty 
are managerial employees but is in the words of Justice Brennan 
"antithetical to the whole concept of academic freedom. ’2  What the 
majority of the Court, and Don Wollett, failed to understand is that the 
effective management of the university requires, indeed thrives, on a 
constructive tension between faculty and administration. This is why Howard 
Mumford Jones stated, in a classic defense of tenure in 1958, that "the code 
of academic freedom put forth by the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) . . . postulates an opposition between the administration 
of the American University and the true professional interests of the faculty 
members.’ 
The notion that a public enterprise might depend on the protected 
independent judgment of its employees, as we shall further consider below, 
finds little more support in state than federal court. But the issue is 
differently presented because, where state legislation has required the 
courts to respect faculty bargaining, the courts have not been able to deny, 
but only to circumscribe, that right by limiting the scope of bargaining. At 
the 1979 Conference, Jim Begin asked the interesting question whether 
professionals, based on their special expertise, have a greater role in 
negotiations in determining policy than non-professionals."2 Ironically, 
although Don Wollett discussed a draft California code which deprived the 
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faculty of any managerial role, California is the one state where Begin found 
a code which provides explicit protection of faculty participation in 
managerial decision-making; though bargaining on these issues amy occur 
only if the faculty senate defers to bargaining or the administration refuses 
to respect the senate. 
The courts in New Jersey, Begin notes, have prohibited bargaining all 
matters ordinarily deemed permissive in the private sector on the theory 
that such bargaining would constitute an improper delegation of public 
power not to the faculty per se, but to a process independent of direct 
public control. Why a collective agreement is less subject to public control 
than any other contract, I leave to the imaginative reasoning of the New 
Jersey courts. More commonplace juridical reasoning generally finds that 
the issue is one of balancing the extent to which an issue is one of 
employment interests as against academic or public policy concerns. 
Where, as Begin noted, the Michigan courts found that any issue which is 
’minimally a condition of employment,’ is mandatorily negotiable, the 
Minnesota Courts subsequently determined that only narrowly construed 
terms and conditions of employment are mandatory. The Michigan Court 
required negotiation of a teaching evaluation form, despite it prior approval 
by an academic senate as well as the administration, because the form 
could affect personnel decisions. The Minnesota Court found on the other 
hand, that only the procedural steps but not the standards for such 
decisions were mandatorily negotiable since the standards shaped public 
policy.J Other states fall in between. None of these save New Jersey, to 
my knowledge, forbids bargaining on matters related to academic policy 
and, of course, all permit bargaining on the employment impact of academic 
decisions. 
When faculty bargain matters of academic policy, bargaining is rarely over 
substance but almost always limited to establishing and assuring the 
procedures for faculty participation and respect for faculty judgment in 
other venues. For example, the academic policies of concern to the Yeshiva 
Court, including program, curricula, admissions, grading, instructional 
format, and graduation standards, as well as specific faculty status 
decisions, are rarely if ever, bargained. The faculty role in such matters is 
however, as Barbara Lee has documented, frequently presupposed or 
ensured in collective agreements.JJ. Accordingly, limits on the scope of 
bargaining are only material to the extent that they prevent, as in New 
Jersey, or hinder, as in Minnesota, the faculty agent from negotiating 
guarantees of faculty participation through shared governance structures. 
The threat to the faculty role in shared governance rarely proceeds from 
bargaining, but rather from the denial of the opportunity to bargain or 
limitations on the scope of bargaining which prevent the faculty from 
protecting participation in governance. Despite the Court’s professed respect 
for shared authority in the Yeshiva decision, Justice OConner writing for the 
majority in the Knight case observed that though 
there is a strong, if not universal or uniform, tradition of faculty 
participation in school governance, and there are numerous policy 
arguments to support such participation. . . . this court has never 
recognized a constitutional right of faculty to participate in policy-
making in academic institutions.2 
Similarly, I am not aware of any state court which, in limiting the scope of 
faculty bargaining over managerial or public policy, has found protections 
for the traditional faculty role in such matters. 
Consequently, despite the judicially created conflict between faculty 
bargaining and faculty governance, the legal right to bargain is the principle 
source of the faculty’s collective power, in many public colleges and 
universities, to ensure continued and effective participation in shared 
governance. This participation is increasingly threatened by the application 
to universities of the autocratic management practices Don Wollett identifies 
with the "20th Century of personnel administration." Many seek to complete 
these developments which have led Justice Brennan to observe that 
’education has become a ’big business" and that "the task of running the 
university enterprise has been transferred from the faculty to an 
autonomous administration which faces the same pressures to cut costs and 
increase efficiencies that impact any large industrial organization." 
The effective governance of universities requires a creative counterpoint 
between the faculty’s emphasis on professional academic priorities and the 
administration’s representation of financial limitations and the 
comprehensive mission of the institution. Historically, the faculty achieved 
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their influence by virtue of their market power in periods of university 
expansion and sustained this influence through practices created and 
institutionalized at such times. But only a small proportion of faculty at a 
small proportion of research universities, those most highly regarded as 
measured by the ability to command the highest price, achieve and 
maintain their authority based on their individual market power.1A 
In the absence of collective bargaining, the collective academic priorities of 
most faculties and their institutions lack foundation in market power or in 
law. Absent such a foundation, the academic and public policy matters the 
courts profess to protect depend increasingly on the decisions of 
institutional managers who are necessarily more responsive to 
considerations of cost, politics and administrative control than faculty. This 
is not to say that administrators are indifferent to academic priorites, 
anymore than to say that faculty are indifferent to cost or community 
needs, but clearly the emphasis and order of priorities very. 
Even in industry the notion that undivided management is more effective is 
subject to increasing question. In a review of recent management studies, 
Roger Alcaly finds numerous empirical studies to support the proposition 
that replacing unilateral management and job insecurity with employee 
participation in decision-making and job security improves the performance 
of their firms. 15 In universities, the need for the faculty’s professional 
judgment should be evident in Justice Powell’s summary of the faculty’s 
managerial responsibilities: 
"They decide what courses will be offered, when they will be scheduled and 
to whom they will be taught. They debate and determine teaching methods, 
grading policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively decide which 
students will be admitted, retained and graduated." 
If one recognizes that these are, in fact, decisions in which faculty and 
administrators share, one may reasonably argue about the appropriate 
relative weight to give to administrative and faculty judgment with respect 
to each issue. But those who believe that we would do well to shift the 
balance substantially toward administrative management should reflect on 
the structural imperatives that would lead to further substitution of 
economic and political for academic priorities in curricula, admissions, 
grading, and faculty appointments.0 
Advocates of managerial administration who assure us that they will 
safeguard academic priorities despite the political and economic constraints 
are similar to advocates for alternatives to tenure who assure us they will 
protect academic freedom. Indeed, one need not be a conspiracy theorist to 
note that the PEW Foundation has promoted and funded both efforts. On the 
one hand, it is in the PEW funded Policy Perspectives that we find the 
proposal that: "Changes in how the faculty regard themselves and their 
institutions lie at the heart of the restructuring process. What faculty are 
being asked to do is return--in effect, to give back--a portion of their ability 
to define their own tasks and performance standards."ia On the other, the 
PEW funded AAFIE New Pathways project seeks to organize the academic 
assault on tenure. 	 To complete the linkage the President of AAHE 
recently resigned to become the higher education officer for PEW. 
The linkage is not conspiratorial but practical. Tenure is the legal foundation 
of individual faculty rights. Without tenure, faculty will lack the autonomy to 
exercise professional judgment without fear of retaliation. Those who seek 
to impose their agendas on higher education though managerial domination 
need to eliminate tenure and are prepared to do so-- even at the cost of 
offering "higher salaries, more frequent sabbaticals, more desirable 
workloads, or some other valued trade-off."20 Remember when the 
opponents of faculty bargaining opined that faculty unions might trade off 
tenure?--Unions didn’t, anymore than they bargained away governance, so 
now AAHE proposes to buy off faculty one at a time in the name of 
"diversity." 
Recent events in Minnesota perfectly illustrate the interconnection between 
tenure and governance, on the one hand, and governance and bargaining 
on the other. The Minnesota Regents set out to modify tenure. They set 
aside a compromise tenure reform proposal reluctantly put forward by the 
faculty senate and unilaterally proposed an alternative drafted with the 
assistance of a leader of the AAHE "New Pathways" project. This proposal 
not only sought to circumscribe tenure by increasing the oversight of 
tenured faculty and easing the procedures and standards for discipline and 
discharge. To facilitate ’re-engineering" it also removed the faculty senate 
from significant involvement in program reorganization and required that 
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the faculty maintain "a proper attitude of industry and cooperation with 
others within and without the university community."j. 
When the faculty senate, and even statements by the nationally prominent 
faculty, proved an insufficient obstacle to the Trustee’s proposed actions the 
faculty petitioned for collective bargaining. Only when the Trustees 
retreated and signaled that they would adopt drop their more egregious 
proposals and the aptly named "Regent’s Professors" withdrew their 
support, did the impetus to bargain diminish to the extent that the 
bargaining proponents lost by less than one percent of votes cast. The 
serious threat of collective bargaining successfully protected both shared 
governance and tenure where the nationally prominent faculty could not. 
The University of Minnesota is the sort of leading research univeristy in 
which academic values have heretofore been defended, as Seymour Lipset 
noted, by the market power of such leading faculty.22 But public research 
universities have lost the support required to maintain their market position. 
One indicator of the declining market power of faculty in public research 
universities is the diminished salaries for compared to private research 
universities: in 1975-76 nominal average salaries for full professors were 
$24,150 in public universities and $26,540 in private universities, by 1995-
96 the respective averages were $69,750 to $88,050 and the proportion 
had declined from 91% to 79%.23 Although public sector acdemic 
management seeks to protect its most prestigious individual faculty 
members by increasing internal differentiation, most public research 
university faculty are losing economic ground and individual influence. 
Consequently, we have reached a situation In which the attack on faulty 
tenure and authority, particularly in the public sector where the fiscal 
squeeze generates recurrent public demands to subordinate academic to 
economic priorities, has provoked the faculty of a leading public research 
university to think the unthinkable. In these circumstances, it is not not only 
not true, as Don Wollett proclaimed, that collective bargaining displaces 
faculty governance, but it is likely that only collective bargaining can 
preserve effective faculty governance in the public universities. The market 
may protect those few faculty, and students, who find a place in the small 
number of elite private research universities (and selective liberal arts 
colleges). Collective bargaining has become the essential legal and political 
foundation for faculty participation in shared governance in publically 
supported universities. Collective bargaining is, therefore, the last, best 
defense of the academic priorities that determine the quality of education 
for the vast majority of students in the face of the perpetual fiscal crisis 
which continues to erode the quality of publically assured educational 
opportunity. 
Notes: 
1. Margaret Chandler (with Connie Chiang, "Management Rights Issues in 
Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," Proceedings, First Annual 
Conference, 1973, National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in 
Higher Education, pp. 58-66) did explore the propensity of most higher 
education contracts to include management rights clauses of varying 
strength and outline some of the areas in which faculty sought to participate 
in managerial decisions. With Dan Julius, she further assessed these issues 
in subsequent conferences as well. ("By Whose Right? Management Rights 
and Governance in the Unionized Institution," Proceedings ....1985, 
NCSCBHE, pp.  89-117; and "Rights Issues: A Scramble for Power," 
Proceedings. . ., 1980, pp.  58-64). A more recent analysis has been 
prepared by Gary Rhoades, "Managed Professionals: Unionized Faculty and 
Restructuring Academic Labor," unpublished MS, 1996. 	 cj~J.otxt, 
2. Donald H. Wollett, "Historical Development of Collective Bargaining and 
Current Extent," Proceedings, .... 1973, pp.  29, 37, 40. Back to text. 
3. Caesar Naples, "Collegiality and Collective Bargaining: They Belong 
Together," Proceedings .... 1973, pp. 51-55. Back to text. 
4. Caesar Naples, "Governance: Senates and Unions," and Irwin H. 
Polishook, "The debate Over faculty Unions and Governance," Proceedings. 
1989, pp. 10-27. Back to text. 
5. Wollett, op. cit, p. 33. Back to text. 
6. NLRB v.Yeshiva University, 444U.S. 672 (1980), 103 LRRM 2533. .ckt.Q 
7. Ibid., 2537. Back to text. 
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/issues/CB/beniamincollbarg.htm 	 1/11/2012 4
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 7 [2012], Art. 25
http://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss7/25
AAUP: Faculty and Management Rights in Higher Education Collective Bargaining: A F... Page 7 of 7 
8. Howard Mumford Jones, The American Concept of Academic Freedom, 
in Academic Freedom and Tenure," ed. by Louis Joughin, the University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1969, p.  240. BaCkg_tex 
9. James P. Begin, Scope of Bargaining: Implications for Traditional Faculty 
Governance Proceedings .... April 1979, p.  51. Back to text. 
10. Ibid., p.  54; University Education Association v. Regents of the 
University of Minnesota, 353 NW2nd 534, 122LLRM 2569 (Minn., 1984). 
Back to text. 
11. Barbara A. Lee, Contractually Protected Senates at Four-Year 
Colleges,’ Proceedings .... April, 1981, pp.  56-61. Back to text. 
12. Minnesota Board of Community Colleges v. Leon W. Knight, 465 U.S.271 
(1984), 1115 LRRM 2785. 	 text 
13. Yeshiva, 103 LRRM 2538. Back to text. 
14. Seymour Martin Lipset, The Academic As Political Man or Women,’ 
Proceedings . . .,April, 1989, pp.  7-8. Back to text. 
15. Roger E. Alcaly, "Reinventing the Corporation," New York Review of 
Books, Vo. XLIV, No. 6 (April 10, 1997), pp.  38-45. Back to text. 
16. Yeshiva, 103 LRRM 2532. ..çktolt. 
17. I have described the consequences of increasing managerial control at 
other Baruch presentations and will not repeat them here. See: 
"Unionization and Academic Excellence," Proceedings ....1985, pp.  23-27; 
and "A Faculty Response to the Fiscal Crisis: From Defense to Offense," in 
Higher Education Under Fire, ed. by Michael Berube and Cary Nelson, 
Routledge, 1995, pp. 52-72. Back to text. 
18. Policy Perspectives, PEW Higher Education Research Program, February 
1993, Vol. 4, No. 4; p. 9A. Back to text. 
19. "New Pathways: Faculty Careers and Employment in the 21st Century," 
American Association for Higher Education," March, 1997. Back to text. 
20. Ibid., p.  5. 	 ckoaxt. 
21. "Minnesota Board of Regents Policy on Facuty Tenure," Section 10.2, 
Draft of September 5, 1996. Back to text. 
22. Lipset, op. cit. Back to text. 
23. AAUP Reports On the Economic Status of the Profession for 1975-76 and 
1995-96. Back to text. 
Printer-Friendly Pane 
ffrne I Privacy Policy 
American Association of University Professors 
1133 Nineteenth Street, NW, Suite 200 
Washington, DC 20036 
Phone: 202-737-5900 I  Fax: 202-737-5526 
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/issues/CB/benjaminco1lbarg.htm 	 1/11/2012 5
Levine: Workshop: Negotiations 103 CLE Credit - AAUP Faculty and Manageme
Published by The Keep, 2012
